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JAN B. MIDGLEY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
MATTHEW T. MIDGLEY,

Supreme Court No. 20,195

Defendant and Appellant.
000O000

REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The Appellant is appealing from an Amended Decree of
Divorce (hereafter called "THE DECREE") prepared by Plaintiff's
counsel, which the Fourth District Court ordered entered into
the Court record as of April 20, 1984.

(See August 20th Minute

Entry, record page 126.) The trial Court ordered Plaintiff's
counsel to prepare "THE DECREE" after the trial Court concluded
that the previously prepared "Order Modifying Decree" and
the proposed "Amended Decree Nunc Pro Tunc", both prepared
by Defendant/Appellant's counsel, did not accurately reflect
the stipulation of the parties as said stipulation was stated
to the Court by Defendant/Appellant's counsel on April 4,
1983 (see transcript of April 4, 1983 "Stipulation and Hearing",
record pp. 154-157 and see "Rulings" of the Court dated February
6, 1984 and June 19, 1984, record pages 84 and 106).

The

"Order Modifying Decree" dated May 2, 1983 (approximately
one year after the original decree was entered) prepared by
-1-

Defendant/Appe1lant's counsel provided language amending
retroactively for one (1) year the child support amount of
Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00), set forth in the original
Decree, and provided language concerning visitation rights
inconsistent with the original Decree of pivorce and the oral
and written stipulations of the parties.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The original Decree of Divorce was entered in the lower
Court on May 4, 1982. That Decree provided in the first of
two paragraphs styled "5" that the Plaintiff was to have custody
and the Defendant had the right of reasonable visitation.
The second paragraph styled "5" provided for restricted visitation
of the Defendant only in the presence of specified parties (R. 15).
Prior to the end of 1982, Defendant motioned the trial
Court to set aside the Decree of Divorce, which motion was
granted by the Court in the Ruling on December 20, 1982 (record,
p. 28 ). The matter was set for trial on April 4, 1983 at
which time counsel for the respective parties (ANDREW MCCULLOUGH
for the Defendant/Appellant and RICHARD HILL for the Plaintiff/
Respondent) appeared before the Court and entered into a
stipulation providing for the reinstatement of all of the paragraphs and provisions of the original Decree of Divorce (including
implicitly both paragraphs styled "5") except for paragraph
"7" and paragraph "8".

(Record, p. 154-155)

No finding of

fact was made by the Court that there was any good cause for
implementing the stipulation stated to the Court "Nunc Pro Tunc".
-2-

Nothing was contained in the stipulation stated by counsel to
the Court on that date that the stipulation was intended to
or that the parties had agreed that the stipulation be implemented "Nunc Pro Tunc".

Based upon that stipulation the Court

ruled from the bench as follows:

"The Court will now make

an Order striking the Court's Ruling [the Ruling setting aside
the original Decree of Divorce] and striking your answer and
counterclaim."

(Record lines 11-13 p. 154 )

At the end of

the hearing the Court stated further "Alright.
will approve the stipulation.
on this matter."

The Court

The Court will be in recess

(Record lines 11 and 12, p. 156 ) The parties

were not present at that stipulation hearing on April 4, 1983.
On or about May 2, 1983 the Defendant, Appellent's counsel
submitted to the Court and "Order Modifying Decree".

The

written order as submitted to the Court Wcis consistent with
the oral stipulation in providing for the reinstatement of
the original Decree except for paragraphs 7 and 8.

However

the written order was significantly different than the oral
stipulation made to the Court in the language used to describe
the terms of visitation.
Thereafter, Attorney Hill withdrew from the case and
Attorney Arron F. Jepson appeared for the Plaintiff/Respondent.
Plaintiff/Respondent's new counsel motioned the Coijrt on or
about September 22, 1983 for a clarification of inconsistencies
which the Plaintiff saw between the oral stipulation, the
'Order Modifying Decree" and the original Decree of Divorce
-3-

with respect to visitation terms. (R.41)

Plaintiff also requested

that an evidenciary hearing be held during which both parties
could present evidence bearing on the issue of visitation
and ask the trial Court to base a decision clarifying the
visitation upon said evidence. (R.41) Simultaneous with the filing
of the Plaintiff/Respondent•s motion the Defendant/Appellant
filed a motion for relief from judgment claiming a clerical
mistake and asking the Court to simply strike paragraph 5
of the original Decree (without making reference to which
paragraph 5 was intended) and alleging that such relief would
solve all of the problems of inconsistent language.

(R.p. 56 )

The Defendant/Appellant urged the trial Court to deny the Plaintiff/Respondent's request for an evidentiary hearing.
(R. lines 22-23 p. 60)
The trial Court denied the Plaintiff/Respondentfs motion for
clarification and for an evidentiary hearing. (R. 84) The trial Court
granted the Defendant/Appellant's motion to correct a clerical
mistake and

struck paragraph 5 from the original Decree

of Divorce.

Defendant/Appellant's counsel prepared an "Amended

Decree Nunc Pro Tunc" and submitted the same to the Court.
Plaintiff/Respondent's counsel objected tp the proposed order.
Two hearings were held, one on March 16, 1984 and another
on April 20, 1984, during which arguments of counsel were
heard by the Court concerning the proposed Amended Decree
of Divorce and the objections filed by Plaintiff/Respondentfs
counsel.

(Record see pp.

90
-4-

,

97

, and 100

) On June

19, 1984 the Court made its Ruling concerning the proposed
order and the objections thereto and ordered Plaintiff/Respondent's
counsel to prepare an amended decree of divorce-

Plaintiff/

Respondent's counsel prepared an amended decree of divorce
which decree of divorce was entered and signed by the Court
on the 20th day of August, 1984, and from which the Appellant
now appeals.

(R. pp. 10 6 and

10 7 )

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff/Respondent seeks the Supreme Court's affirmation
of the final Amended Decree of Divorce as entered by the trial
Court on August 20, 1984.

Plaintiff/Respondents also seeks

a ruling denying Appellant's claim for two (2) changes in
form in the final Amended Decree of Divorce which seeks first
to alter the visitation and secondly seeks to reduce the first
year's child support amount (from the date of the original
decree May 4, 1982 through May 2, 1983) from Two Hundred Fifty
Dollars ($250.00) per month as originally ordered by the trial
Court to One Hundred Fifty Dollars ($150.00) per month, a
total of Twelve Hundred Dollars ($1200.00).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts in this case revolve primarily
around the procedural issues which were raised in the lower
court and around the disposition as outlined in this brief
in the section entitled "Disposition in the Lower Court".
Part of the argument in the lower court between the parties
involved the issue whether their was ever a stipulation agreed
-5-

upon by the parties.

There are two (2) affidavits in this

file which were filed with the lower court.

One (1) affidavit

from Mr. Hill claiming that the Plaintiff agreed to the stipulation as stated to the Court on April 4, 1983 and another
affidavit from the Plaintiff which claimed that she did not
agree to that stipulation and did not authorize Mr. Hill to enter
into that stipulation. (R. 65, 49) The low0r court ruled that the
stipulation as stated to the Court on April 4, 1983 was in
fact the stipulation of the parties and that the Plaintiff
was bound by Mr. Hill's representation to the trial Court
that his client had authorized him to entter into the stipulation.

That stipulation was stated to the Court by the De-

fendant/Appellant's counsel with regard to the issue of visitation as follows:
"Mr. Midgley will receive three (3) weeks
visitation with the minor child to be nonconsecutive. The exact times and dates to
be worked out between the parties. And that
each year hereafter, until it reaches a
maximum of six (6) weeks, that |vould increase
the total visitation would increase by
one (1) week. So this year thrbe (3) weeks,
next year four (4) weeks, and so on until it
gets to six (6). The exact timps and places
to be worked out between the parties."
"And once the six (6) weeks gbes into effect,
the parties will divide the costs of transporting the child back and forth, because the
child will then be old enough to travel on
his own." (R. lines 3-14, p.
)
This language is the stipulation which the trial Court
found to be the stipulation of the parties.

(R. see transcript

of hearing dated March 16, 1984, R. pp. 1^1-170, and lines
13-18 on p. 170 )
-6-

When the Defendant/Appellant's counsel prepared the "Order
Modifying Decree" he put in the following language:
2a. Defendant is hereby granted reasonable
visitation rights with his minor son, to include at least three (3) weeks during the
year 1983, the increase to four (4) weeks during 1984, five (5) weeks during 1985, and
six (6) weeks during 1986 and subsequent
years. The three (3) weeks of visitation during 1983 shall be non-consecutive, due to the
age of the minor child.
2b. Commencing in 1986, when the child is
old enough to travel on his own, Plaintiff
and Defendant shall equally split the costs
of transporting the child between the parties
for visitation. Until then, Defendant shall
be responsible for picking up and delivering
the child for visitation. Defendant Shall
give Plaintiff one (1) week's notice before
exercising his right or visitation. (Record
pp. 33 -35 )
The statement of facts as contained herein together with
the statement of the disposition in the lower court as contained
in this brief together with the statement of facts as contained
in the appellant's brief sets forth substantially the facts
of this case.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
The issues raised by the Defendant/Appellant in this
appeal are as follows:
1.

Whether the "Order Modifying Decree" dated May 2,

1983 (drafted by Appellant's counsel), was, in part, an invalid
Nunc Pro Tunc order making an order "now" (May 2, 1983) for
"then" (oral stipulation and oral order of the Court of April
4, 1983), which altered the Court's previous order and constitu-7-

ted a substantial departure from the earlier announcement
and did not merely reflect the previous ruling of the Court
concerning child suppott and visitation, where the original
April 4, 1983 oral order of the Court contained no such "Nunc
Pro Tunc" language and no finding of good cause was made by
the Court as required by Section 30-4a-l, U.C.A., 1953 as
amended in 1983.
2.

Whether the trial Court properly corrected itself

(its previous rulings) by making two (2) changes in the May
2, 1983 "Order Modifying Decree:" (a) striking therefrom the
"Nunc Pro Tunc" language concerning child support and visitation, and (b) ordering the drafting of new visitation language,
both of which changes properly reflect th£ original Oral Order
of the Court and the original Oral Stipulation of the parties
dated April 4, 1983, in the form of an Antended Decree of Divorce
(drafted by Plaintiff/Respondent's counsel).
3.

Whether it is proper for the Appellant to request

Nunc Pro Tunc relief on appeal which wouW require the Supreme
Court to find facts contrary to those found by the trial Court
with respect to the trial Court's interpretation of its own
original Oral Order at the April 4, 1983 stipulation hearing,
which interpretation is embodied in the ^inal Amended Decree
of Divorce from which the Appellant takes this appeal.
4.

Can the Appellant properly request an order from

the Supreme Court of Utah granting an evidentiary hearing
after the Appellant successfully objected to the Respondent's
-8-

request for an evidentiary hearing at the trial Court level,
concerning the issues of visitation and child support, especially
where no allegation of error has been made and no issue raised
on appeal regarding the trial Court's ruling in Appellant's
favor denying

evidentiary hearing.
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES AND ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE APPELLANT'S "ORDER MODIFYING DECREE" AND THE RESPONDENT'S
FINAL "AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE" SHOULD EACH BE COMPARED TO
THE ORIGINAL ORAL STIPULATION AND THE ORIGINAL ORAL ORDER OF
THE TRIAL COURT FOR ACCURACY, RATHER THAN BEING COMPARED TO
EACH OTHER AS THE APPELLANT HAS DONE (WITH RESPECT ONLY TO THE
ISSUES OF VISITATION AND REDUCED CHILD SUPPORT).
There was a disagreement at the trial Court level concerning whether there was ever a stipulation at all between the
parties.

That issue however has not been raised on appeal.

It was this argument

at the trial Court level which caused

the trial Court to determine that there not only had been
a stipulation entered into between the parties with regard
to visitation and child support, but also that the stipulation
entered into was that stipulation orally stated to the Court
on April 4, 1983, at which time the Court ordered that that
stipulation be approved (Record, paragraphs 1 and 2, p. 85;
lines 11-12, p. 156; lines 13-21, p. 170). The trial Court
therefore made a specific finding of fact that there was a
stipulation as to visitation and child support, that that
stipulation was the Oral Stipulation stated to the Court on
April 4, 1983, and that it was that stipulation which should
-9-

correctly be reflected in the final "Amended Decree of Divorce"
from which the Appellant appeals.

However/ the issue whether

their was a stipulation and what the stipulation was as found
by the trial Court, has not been raised iti this appeal. Therefore both parties are bound by the trial Court's finding of
fact as to what constituted the parties' stipulation, and
what the trial Court's order was pursuant thereto.
The Appellant wants the trial Court to compare the two
(2) written documents (the "Order Modifying Decree" prepared
by the Appellant's attorney and the "Amended Decree of Divorce"
prepared by Respondent's attorney) rather than comparing each
of those documents to the April 4, 1983 Otral Stipulation of
the parties and Oral Order of the Court.
POINT II
HOW SHOULD THE FIRST ISSUE, STATED ABOVE, BE ANSWERED?
The answer should be that the "Order Modifying Decree"
dated May 2, 1983 and prepared by Appellant is, in part, an
invalid "Nunc Pro Tunc" order.

After carbful comparison of

that order with the original Oral Stipulation and Oral Order
of the trial Court, it is clear that there was no discussion
on April 4, 1984 either between counsel or with the Court
that indicated that the stipulation was to be implemented
retroactively.

There is also no "finding of good cause" by

the trial Court that a Nunc Pro Tunc order should enter, which
finding is required by Section 30-4a-l, d.C.A., 1953 as
amended in 1983.

The obvious intention of the parties was to
-10-

effectuate a reduction in the child support for the months
following the April 4, 19 83 stipulation.

That means in simple

terms, that the original Decree of Divorce provision granting
Two Hundred Fifty-Dollars ($250.00) per month to the Plaintiff
as child support had accrued each month from the date of entry
of the original Decree until April 4, 1983, the twelth month.
This Court has announced in its March 18, 1977 decision in
the case of Larsen vs. Larsen, 561 P. 2d. 10 77 that:
"In this jurisdiction alimony and support payments become unalterable as they accrue; therefore, periodic installments cannot be changed or
modified after the installments have become due."
The Larsen case, supra, denied the state's attempt to retroactively modify support payments which had accrued in a period
of time in the past.

Although the attempt in the Larsen case

was to increase the child support retroactively, and the attempt
by the Appellant in this case is to decrease the child support
retroactively, the principle of law is identicle.

In its

May 1, 1984 decision in the case of Preece vs. Preece, 682 P. 2nd.
298 (Utah 1984) this Supreme Court interpreted Section 30-4a-l
of the Utah Code Annotated.

The Preece case announced the doctrine

that :
"A nunc pro tunc order should be the reflection of a previously made ruling. The Court
had orally announced that the decree was "to
become final upon signing." By making it
effective as of the trial date rather than upon
signing, the Court altered its previous ruling.
It did not merely reflect its previous ruling.
Even though it did not otherwise deviate from
its oral announcement, this alteration of the
effective date was nonetheless a substantial
-11-

departure from the earlier announcement. Nunc
pro tunc should not be used in (that circumstance,
(emphasis added) Preece, supra, at 300.
It is this very section 30-4a-l U.C.IA. upon which the
Appellant relies for support of its claim on appeal that Appellant's use of the nunc pro tunc language in its "Order Modifyi n g Decree" is justified.

This is cleanly contrary to the

ruling of this Court in the Preece case and contrary to public
policy.

Because of the pressures upon the trial Court and

the trial Court's reliance upon adversarial attorneys as officers
of the Court in drafting written orders Which properly reflect
the rulings of the Court, it would certainly be against public
policy to sanction the position urged upon this honorable
Court by the Appellant.

By the stroke of a pen (the Appellant's

counsel's typewriter in this case) an Oral Stipulation of
the parties through their counsel, which was approved by order
of the trial Court, was miraculousy and suddenly transformed
into a retroactive order, contrary to the Oral Stipulation.
The transformed order (Order Modifying Decree) suddently reached
back in time twelve (12) months and deprived the Plaintiff/
Respondent of eleven or twelve hundred dollars in child support
payments which had already accrued but which had not yet been
paid.
In short, "the function of a nunc pro tunc order is not
to make an order now for then, but to en1(:er now for then an
order previously made".

Preece vs. Preece, 682 P. 2d. 298
-12-

(Utah 1984) , at 299.

The previously made order of the trial

Court was the Oral Order of the Court entered at the April
4, 1983 hearing after listening to the Oral Stipulation of
the parties through their counsel.

It contained no nunc pro

tunc language.
A careful examination of the Oral Stipulation language
(Record, lines 24-25, p. 154 and lines 3-8, p. 155) reveal
that the agreement as to visitation was that the visitation
be "nonconsecutive".

On line 7 of page 155 of the record

MR. MCCULLOUGH stated to the Court "that would increase
total visitation would increase by one (1) week.".

the

The refer-

ences clearly to the three (3) weeks of non-consecutive visitation, which would increase by one (1) week thereafter through
1986.

Contrary to the express language of the Oral Stipulation,

the Appellant's "Order Modifying Decree", dated May 2, 1983,
says what the Court did not say.

The Court approved the Oral

Stipulation as it was stated and as shown in the record previously referred to.

The written order states that there

would be increasing amounts of visitation each year through
1986, but changes the nonconsecutive language of the Oral
Stipulation and limits the nonconsecutive language to the
first (1) year, 1983.

This was>not the language which was

approved and ordered by the Court on April 4, 1983.

This

Court has declared in Preece, supra:
"A motion nunc pro tunc is used to make the
records speak the truth; it may not be used to
correct the Court's failure to speak."
-13-

The Court did not change the nonconsecutive language
of the Oral Stipulation.

It was only the Appellant's Order

which changed nonconsecutive visitation tt> consecutive visitation , after the fact, through use of a mint pro tunc order.
POINT III
HOW SHOULD ISSUE NUMBER II, SET FORTH ABOVE, BE DECIDED?
The answer is yes.

The trial Court properly acted in strik-

ing the nunc pro tunc language from the M&y 2, 1983 "Order
Modifying Decree".

The Court also acted properly in ordering

the drafting of hew visitation language td comport with thfe
express language of the Oral Stipulation of the parties as
adopted by the Order of the trial Court oin April 4, 1983.
(See generally Preece, supra)
The authority cited by the Appellant in the case of Sears
vs. Riemersma/ 655 P. 2d. 1105 is not the controlling authority
in this case.

This is not a case where the Court is seeking

to interpret a contract.

The issues on appeal are not what

the contract or stipulation was between the parties. The
trial Court made a finding as to what the stipulation was,
its terms, and when it was made.
raised in this appeal.

That isisue has not been

The other cases cited by the Appellant

(DuBois vs. Nye, 584 P. 2d. 823 (Utah 1918); Nixon and Nixon,
Inc. vs. John New and Associates, 641 P. £d. 144 (Utah 1982);
and Sears vs. Riemersma, 655 P. 2d. 1105 ^Utah 1982) supra)
are not applicable or controlling in this appeal.

The trial

Court in making changes and amendments tq the original
-14-

Decree of Divorce, and the "Order Modifying Decree" attempted
to conform the Court's rulings and orders with the Oral Stipulation of the parties as the trial Court found that stipulation
to be, and as the trial Court ordered it adopted.

The parties

are therefore bound by that finding of fact by the trial Court.
First of Denver Mortg. Investors vs. C. N. Zundel, 600
P. 2d. 521, at 527, is the case in which this Supreme Court
on August 24, 1979 stated:
"Parties are bound by their stipulations
unless relieved therefrom by the Court,
which has the power to set aside a stipulation entered into inadvertently or for
justifiable cause."
The trial Court in this case has not relieved the parties
from their stipulation but has in fact stated unequivocably
that the parties are bound by the April 4, 1983 Oral Stipulation.
There has been no claim that there has been a mistake of
fact* raised as an issue in this appeal.

Therefore the parties

are bound by the trial Court's finding of fact and the Appellant
cannot claim relief against a stipulation, found as a fact
by the trial Court.

(See United Factors vs. T. C. Associates,

Inc., 445 P. 2d. 766, at 769)
POINT IV
HOW SHOULD ISSUES XII and IV, STATED HEREINABOVE, BE DECIDED?
In order to grant the "nunc pro tunc" relief requested
by the Appellant in this appeal, the appellate Court would
have to substitute its fact finding judgment for that of the
trial Court with respect to the trial Court's interpretation
-15-

of its own original Oral Order adopting the Oral Stipulation
of the parties as stated to the Court on the 4th day of April,
1983.

(Record, pp. 154-155, and 156)

It is well settled law never-

theless that unless the trial Court clearly abuses its discretion,
the appellate Court will not substitute its judgment for that
of the trial Court's.

As stated previously in this brief,

the Plaintiff/Respondent vigorously

motioned the trial Court

to hold an evidentiary hearing allowing both parties to present
evidence with respect to the child support issue and the visitation issues raised in this appeal.

The Plaintiff/Appellant

vigorously opposed the Respondent's reque$t for an evidentiary
hearing and urged the Court to deny such a request and to
refuse to hold an evidentiary hearing.

($ee Record, p. 41,

first paragraph on page 45, points 2 and 3, pp. 46-47, and
lines 22 and 23, p. 60, paragraph 7, p. 711, paragraphs 3,
4, 5, 6, and 7, pp. 73-75, and the last sentence on page 84)
The principles of equity and fair play should estop the
Apellant from receiving relief on appeal in the form of an
order granting him an evidentiary hearing, when the Appellant
at the trial Court level could have had an evidentiary hearing
and could have presented any and all evidence he desired at
that hearing respecting child support and visitation, but
vigorously and successfully resisted such relief and opportunity,
apparently because it was requested by the Plaintiff/Respondent.
In other words, the Appellant at the trial Court level wanted
a decision from the trial judge based only upon the Court records
-16-

and successfully resisted the Court holding an evidentiary
hearing.

After the trial Court entered its final decision

based upon the record, including the Stipulation of the parties
as the trial Court found it to be, the Appellant now seeks
an evidentiary hearing in an effort to reverse the trial Court's
judgment based upon the record.

This position of the Appellant

is clearly contrary to law and is without merit.

An analogous

situation arose in the case of Minshew vs. Chevron Oil Company,
575 P. 2d. 192, at 193, wherein this Supreme Court declared:
"This contention is without merit for when
a factual matter is submitted for decision on
the record, without objection, the parties are
bound by the record and on the view this Court
is compelled to defer to the judgment of the
trial Court if there is substantial confident,
admissable evidence in that record to support
it."
At the time of the original stipulation herein, April
4, 1983, the Defendant/Appellant failed to request that the
reduction in child support be made retroactive one (1) year
to the date of the original decree and also failed to provide
in the stipulation that the nonconsecutive visitation provision
change at some future point to be consecutive visitation weeks.
The failure of the Appellant to reserve those issues at that
point in time is res judicata.

(See Amos vs. Bennion, 517

P. 2d. 1008 at 1009)
The Appellant had his day in Court at the trial Court
level.

He could have had an evidentiary hearing and could

have clearly set forth consecutive visitation, assuming the
-17-

Plaintiff/Respondent had agreed, and the Appellant further
could have set forth in the Oral Stipulation that the reduction in child support was to be retroactive, however the
Appellant failed to do so.

Since the Appellant failed to

raise those points and the trial level, and affirmatively
resisted the evidentiary hearing at the trial level, the
Appellant cannot now gain such relief at the appelate Court
level.

(See in the matter of the Estate of Andrew Ekker,

432 P. 2d. 45, at 46; and Meyer vs. Deluke, 457 P. 2d. 966,
at 968)
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the two (2) specific areas of modification
in the final "Amended Decree of Divorce" entered by the trial
Court on April 20, 1984 as requested by Appellant should be
denied.

Costs and attorneys fees should be awarded to the

Plaintiff/Respondent.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day of February, 1985.

ARJfoN F." JEPSOlW
Attorney for PLacint iff/Respondent
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I here by certify that I mailed or personally delivered
two true and correct copies of the foregoing "Respondent's
Brief", postage pre-paid, to W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH, attorney for
Appellant, 930 South State Street Suite 10, Orem, UT
this 15th day of February, 1985.
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